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This paper delves into the human factors in the “back-office” of artificial intelligence and of its data-
intensive algorithmic underpinnings. We show that the production of AI is a labor-intensive process, 
which particularly needs the little-qualified, inconspicuous and low-paid contribution of “micro-
workers” who annotate, tag, label, correct and sort the data that help to train and test smart 
solutions. We illustrate these ideas in the high-profile case of the automotive industry, one of the 
largest clients of digital data-related micro-working services, notably for the development of 
autonomous and connected cars. This case demonstrates how micro-work has a place in long supply 
chains, where tech companies compete with more traditional industry players. Our analysis indicates 
that the need for micro-work is not a transitory, but a structural one, bound to accompany the 
further development of the sector; and that its provision involves workers in different geographical 
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How does the current, spectacular development of artificial intelligence (AI) affect labor and work 
organization? Recent attempts to address this complex question revamp the centuries-old conjecture 
that machines may ultimately supersede human contribution (Ricardo 1951 [1821]). News media, 
think tanks, and policymakers have echoed the dire job loss predictions of a few prospective studies 
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014; Frey and Osborne 2017), although historical evidence suggests that 
dynamics of complementarity rather than substitution between labor and machinery might also be in 
place (Autor 2015). 
Moving away from the highly speculative nature of these debates, we endeavor to gain new insight 
by looking at the concrete production processes of AI, as they are implemented today. We claim that 
these processes are – and will increasingly be – labor-intensive. If our stance refutes popular 
pessimistic scenarios of mass and persistent technological unemployment, we do not paint a rosy 
picture either. Indeed AI production not only  relies on the human capital of highly skilled, well-paid 
engineers and scientists; but more subtly, it is predicated on the less visible contribution of little 
qualified, low-paid people who toil to ensure the “last mile” (Gray and Suri 2017). By lifting the veil 
on them, we highlight how their activities and roles take forward, in today’s digitized context, a 
deeply-rooted tendency to reduce many laborers to a reserve of undifferentiated parts, mere add-
ons to machines that require limited skills (Braverman 1974). 
This inconspicuous, low-profile human activity behind AI is known as “micro-work”, a notion that 
encompasses a range of small, fragmented tasks performed remotely online by large numbers of 
providers. Such tasks consist, for example, in identifying objects on a photograph, sorting items in a 
list, answering simple questions, transcribing or copying short texts, or adding labels to images. 
Micro-work is sometimes referred to as “crowd-work” because the mundane, repetitive, and 
atomized nature of this platform-mediated activity makes operators substitutable with each other: a 
job is not given to an identified sub-contractor but to an anonymous, undifferentiated multitude. 
Although each single task may be quick-to-do and unchallenging, the outputs of myriad executors 
add up to constitute large and valuable digital data resources which contribute to AI production: as 
will be discussed at length later, they help training computer vision models, operating voice-activated 
connected objects, providing targeted recommendations. Micro-work is a by-product of the 
“datafication” of our societies (Bastin and Tubaro 2018), whereby more data and increasing 
computational capacity have brought AI research to the fore and in turn, further raised the demand 
for ever-larger, ever-better data assets. It is also an instance of the “commodification” of data in our 
society and the ensuing inequalities, whereby a handful of powerful corporations own, control and 
extract value from data (Fuchs 2019). 
Micro-workers are recruited through dedicated platforms, the most famous of which is Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, with a growing number of competitors worldwide such as Microworkers, 
Clickworker, Appen and Lionbridge. With various arrangements, they act as intermediaries in two-
sided markets (Rochet and Tirole 2003) where clients are AI (and other data-hungry) companies on 
the one side, and workers on the other. With rare exceptions, workers are not formally employees, 
but independent contractors paid by piece-rate, with varying levels of activity and engagement. Part 
of the sector consists in services owned by tech giants who are their exclusive clients. This is the case 
of UHRS (Universal Human Relevance System) controlled by Microsoft, and RaterHub by Google. 
Micro-work involves laborers in over seventy countries (Berg et al 2018; Kuek et al. 2015), with many 
contributors in emerging economies such as India, Indonesia and the Philippines, and a recent surge 
in participation from crisis-affected areas such as Venezuela (Schmidt 2019). 
Amazon’s candid definition of micro-work as “artificial artificial intelligence” stresses its key 
functions: though often little qualified, these humans help AI get past those tasks and activities that 
it cannot solve effectively and/or efficiently. Whether or not the gap between what AI systems claim 
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to achieve and what they need humans to achieve is bridgeable, is an open debate opposing those 
portraying micro-work as a transitional phenomenon and those defining it as a structural, intrinsic 
driver of today’s AI growth. Its role seems to be changing over time: born to supplement AI when it 
fails (Irani 2015), micro-work has progressively moved to offering support for AI development. Ekbia 
and Nardi (2017) see it as a form of “heteromation”, a mode of division of labor between humans 
and machines that reverses the myth of an ideal automation capable of freeing people from the need 
to work. Its very existence is evidence that, whether or not AI might displace employment in future, 
it is already producing an effect on work here and now, shifting groups of laborers into unrecognized, 
“silent” (Star and Strauss 1999) albeit essential activities at its margin. We thus see micro-work as the 
prism through which we can tackle the place of humans in the design and deployment of AI in 
today’s data economy. 
 
2. The automotive industry as a case study 
We illustrate these ideas in the high-profile case of the automotive industry, which has become one 
of the largest clients of digital data-related micro-working services, notably for the development of 
autonomous vehicles and of connected cars. This case best exemplifies how micro-tasks integrate 
long supply chains, no longer limited to digital industries (Ohnemus 2016), but reaching out to core 
economic sectors, whereby major tech companies such as Google and Uber now compete with 
established car manufacturers worldwide. With its very sizeable demand and unprecedentedly high 
quality requirements (to ensure safe traffic circulation), the automotive industry has lately 
transformed the whole micro-work landscape. There is a form of dual dependency in that automobile 
producers need micro-work service providers to sustain the technological developments that keep 
them competitive against their peers; but they are also quasi-oligopsonists who can dictate exact 
specifications to suppliers, play them against one another, and pass off to them many risks, notably 
of variations in demand. The result  is accelerated globalization, proliferation of specialized (rather 
than generalist) platforms (Schmidt 2019), and development of specific AI offers by all players. 
Of note, AI-based innovations in the automotive industry are not all meant to be labor-saving.  
Drivers do not disappear in connected cars where (quite on the contrary) the goal is to provide an 
improved experience, notably through hands-off speech interfaces and a range of assistance 
services. Even autonomous vehicles still require human “safety drivers” who routinely provide 
feedback to engineering teams (and are expected to take control whenever necessary). These human 
inputs are unlikely to disappear entirely, even though contractual arrangements might change (for 
example, companies may eventually replace paid safety drivers by assigning extra responsibilities to 
passengers). Likewise, we will show in what follows that the need for off-the-road, data-related 
micro-work is a structural feature of today’s AI production processes – thus, it is here to stay. 
 
3. Methodology 
To develop our argument, we leverage data from a detailed inventory of micro-working platforms 
that we have built between June 2017 and March 2019. The focus of our study is France, a country 
that is investing heavily in the development of AI; yet the market for micro-working services crosses 
national borders, especially as most tasks can be performed remotely online and rarely require 
physical presence in a given place. Therefore, our inventory also includes platforms that are based in 
France but outsource work to providers overseas (especially in French-speaking African countries 
such as the Ivory Coast, Madagascar and Tunisia), and international platforms that have operations 
(with clients and/or workers) in France. We select from it a sample of 11 platforms that have AI as a 
specific selling point, even though some of them also offer services for a wider range of corporate 




Platform Offer Headquarters Foundation Notes 
Amazon Mechanical 
Turk 
Generalist  Seattle (USA) 2005 Pioneer in the field. 
Pactera Generalist Dalian (China) 1995 
General IT service company; gives 
access to other platforms. 
Clixsense Generalist Hampstead (USA) 2007 
Gives access to the tasks of Figure 
Eight and other data vendors. 
Clickworker 
Generalist (with 
specific AI offer) 
Essen (Germany) 2005 Gives access to UHRS (Microsoft). 
Microworkers 
Generalist (with 
specific AI offer) 
Dallas (USA) 2009  
Lionbridge 
Generalist (with 
specific AI offer) 
Waltham (USA) 1996 
Originally a translation service; has 
subsequently diversified into data 
services. Owns Gengo.ai, a 
specialist company. 




Originally a more generalist IT 
service, recently re-focused on AI. 
Figure Eight Specialized AI San Francisco (USA) 2007 
Formerly called Crowdflower; part 
of Appen since 2019. Recruits 
workers through Clixsense. 
Mighty AI Specialized AI Seattle (USA) 2014 
A service for companies; the related 
micro-work platform is Spare5. 
Wirk  Specialized AI Paris (France) 2018 
A service for companies; the related 
(generalist) micro-work platform is 
Foule Factory, founded in 2014 and 
recruiting workers only in France. 
IsAHit 
Generalist (with 
specific AI offer) 
Paris (France) 2016 
Access reserved to workers in 
(mainly French-speaking) African 
countries. 
Table 1 : List of micro-working services and platforms included in the study. All have an offer of AI-related services, more or 
less explicitly, and have operations (clients and/or workers) in France. 
 
For each of these platforms, we use information retrieved from their websites and communication 
packages, press articles concerning their businesses, and further data from aggregator services such 
as CrunchBase. We also use insights from in-depth interviews that we conducted in 2017-2018 with 
92 micro-workers, platform operators, and clients of these services, most of them based in France.  
Our selection comprises multiple platforms because the most intensely researched one, Mechanical 
Turk, is not representative of current trends: it is one of the few that does not explicitly advertise AI 
services to its clients, although it is clear from the literature that it does offer them (Irani 2016). 
Amazon’s creation is not representative of workers’ diversity either, in that a conspicuous part of 
them are in fact US residents (Difallah et al. 2018); specifically, very few are from France. Mechanical 
Turk operates primarily as an intermediary between clients and workers, without offering much in 
terms of workforce management and quality control – which need to be ensured by clients. 
Of the other platforms listed here, Pactera and Clixsense are multi-activity IT companies that offer 
other services together with micro-work. They act as recruiters or dispatchers for other micro-
working platforms, which is why their offer for the automobile sector is less apparent in their 
communication packages. For example, Clixsense provides workers with access to the tasks of Figure 
Eight (formerly called Crowdflower and, since 2019, part of the Australian giant Appen), which deals 
only with client companies and thus has no direct contact with workers. All other platforms have an 
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explicit AI offer, based on use of micro-work. Some of them like Figure Eight, Mighty AI, Clickworker, 
Appen, IsAHit, and to a lesser extent Wirk, explicitly advertise their AI services to automotive 
companies; Lionbridge does so through Gengo.ai, a Japanese platform which it acquired in 2019. 
The business models of these platforms differ. While some (like Mechanical Turk) function as 
textbook cases of intermediaries in two-sided markets, others (like Appen and Pactera) have multi-
layer structures, whereby different platforms (or companies) take different roles. One recruits 
workers; another manages registration, sign-on, allocation of tasks and day-to-day supervision; a 
third one provides the user interface to execute tasks; yet another liaises with clients. Bigger or more 
demanding client companies value these more complex structures which provide them with extra 
services (from technical tools to workforce management) and  add a degree of opaqueness that 
shields them from the gaze of competitors. Although the details of the underlying commercial 
relationships are undisclosed, these platforms often attract large orders and can thus offer less 
volatile earning opportunities to workers.  
Wirk and IsAHit are French companies, of relatively small size compared to the others, which are all 
international and rather large. Created in 2018, Wirk provides data services to companies, with a 
prominent AI offer. It is part of the same company that manages Foule Factory (from “foule”, the 
French word for “crowd”), a micro-work platform founded in 2014, which recruits contributors only 
from among residents of France, and is a supplier to Wirk. Foule Factory is  a generalist service, 
where micro-workers perform services for varied needs within the digital economy, in addition to AI 
development. IsAHit is a Paris-based company practicing “impact sourcing” along the lines of the 
American Samasource: its clients are mostly French while workers are recruited in low-income 
African countries where remunerations from micro-work compare favorably with local averages.  It 
targets women (considered as particularly interested in opportunities to earn income from home) in 
French-speaking African countries, although it counts a small number of men among its workers and 
has recently expanded into English-speaking Africa. With regard to clients, IsAHit is not a mere 
intermediary but a contractor, which manages all steps of the execution of work on their behalf. 
The interest of including them in our selection goes beyond the intrinsic relevance of the chosen 
country case study. We expect international platforms to attract only specific segments of the 
demand and supply of micro-work, notably those that do not need language and/or country-specific 
knowledge. Conversely, local platforms will channel those parts of the supply and demand of micro-
work which deal with data that cannot be stripped of national or linguistic dimensions. To 
understand the global micro-working market, we juxtapose them and adopt jointly the national and 
international lens – thereby complementing and enriching the results of extant literature, which has 
under-researched national and local platforms so far (Berg et al 2018; Forde et al 2017). 
Starting from one country case, our approach enables to explore the linkages between national and 
international levels in micro-work platform intermediation. It also aims to better define the 
boundaries of competition by considering not only the services offered but also their geographical 
reach in terms of the locations of both clients and workers. It is for this reason that we exclude from 
our selection platforms that do offer AI-for-automobile-services but do not have a presence in 
France, such as Samasource (USA), Playment (India) and Crowd Guru (Germany). We also exclude 
professional freelancing platforms like Upwork which focus on offering access to the services of a 
single provider (not undifferentiated “crowds”) for a specific, usually highly qualified job, such as 
translation, computer graphics, and software development. 
 
4. How micro-work is crucial to AI production 
Let us first go back to the basics, reviewing the essential principles that drive today’s automated 
systems and connecting them to the need for human inputs. The websites of Mighty AI, Figure Eight, 
and to a lesser extent IsAHit, address car makers’ perceived willingness to invest strategically  into 
self-driving cars, as if this was the main (or only) application of AI to the automotive industry. It is 
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true that the recent major technological progresses have revamped the long-standing, but previously 
stagnant, research to develop autonomous vehicles, thereby initiating a fierce race among 
competitors. But without necessarily replacing human drivers, machines may instead accompany 
them. Appen (and Gengo, the Lionbridge subsidiary) highlight consumer demand for effective on-
board virtual assistants, requiring speech interfaces to access all the functionalities of computers and 
mobile phones, without ever taking the driver’s hands and eyes off the road. Appen also suggests 
future uses for road safety purposes: if machines learn to recognize drivers’ emotions on top of their 
words, they will predict distracted driving behavior, and forewarn other machines. Lionbridge insists 
on AI for targeted marketing, using the car infotainment system to suggest products and services, 
based on data about the driver’s preferences and behaviors. 
What all these applications have in common, is that at the current level of technological 
development, they rest on machine-learning, a branch of research at the crossroads of informatics 
and statistics, which develops algorithmic models that access data and use it to figure out a solution 
to an existing problem (such as sorting information, making a complex decision, interpreting a 
request). These models are intended to “learn” a solution based on data, without that solution being 
explicitly programmed. In recent years, machine learning has enabled significant progress in many 
areas. In autonomous vehicles, for instance, even simple rule-based behaviors such as “slow down if 
a pedestrian crosses the street” requires recognizing a pedestrian – a trivial task for humans, an 
extremely complex one for a computer. Machine learning appears as the solution: based on vast 
amounts of existing images, it can find common patterns (such as shapes and trajectories), and it can 
use those to learn to distinguish other pedestrians when they appear again on the road. In practice, 
the algorithm will compare any new passer-by to its stock of images, find similarities, and conclude 
with some degree of certainty whether it “sees” a pedestrian. 
To achieve this, machine learning algorithms need not only large sets of images of pedestrians, but 
also labels that tell them what these images are – whether they show pedestrians at all, how many of 
them, where precisely they are positioned in the picture, etc. Therefore, the “raw” images routinely 
taken by lidars, cameras, and sensor devices mounted on today's robot cars are not enough: to be 
useful, they first need to be annotated. It is here that micro-workers intervene: platforms send those 
images to their online micro-task executors, who identify and label everything that can be seen in 
each of them, from pedestrians and dogs to traffic lights, other cars, bikes etc. 
The job is necessarily huge because, as discussed, the machine can only learn from large amounts of 
data, that would be tedious and lengthy to annotate if just one or few workers were in charge. 
Rather, platforms fragment these large batches into many short, quick-to-do tasks, and allocate them 
to many providers, each of whom will do just one or few. In this way, the work can be done much 
more quickly – and more cheaply in that the platform will just pay for the output received without 
bearing the full cost of waged labor (which would include benefits, payroll taxes etc.). 
What types of tasks do autonomous vehicle producers outsource to micro-workers? The websites of 
(among others) Figure Eight, Mighty AI and IsAHit offer similar products to potential clients: 
 Image classification: organizing images by criteria such as quality (detecting blurry pictures, 
for example), content (what images represent), setting (for example, urban environment vs 
highway). 
 Object detection or tagging: identifying traffic objects within images (such as bikes, buses or 
trees in a street scene) with tools such as bounding boxes, polygons, and outlines. 
 Landmark detection: pinpointing distinctive features and signs in images. 
 Semantic segmentation: pixel-level object detection assigning every dot of an image to an 
object according to a list of relevant types. 
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These activities all support computer vision and are not specific to the automobile industry (they may 
be applied, for example, to medical imagery) but vendor platforms often target car producers and 
provide demos and examples that relate to road traffic. Many of the French workers we surveyed 
reported having done tasks of these types; in one instance, they annotated images of motocross 
races where they had to distinguish different parts of the road and describe them in detail. 
Schmidt (2019) highlights the increasing complexity of these tasks over time: while even just a few 
years ago, grossly recognizing a pedestrian or a dog in a street scene was enough, today’s clients aim 
for much higher levels of detail. Full semantic segmentation provides the highest quality, but it is a 
quite demanding task that requires patience and precision: it may take up to one hour and half to 
segment just one image accurately. It is for this reason, he says, that clients are reducing their use of 
generalist platforms such as Mechanical Turk for these tasks, moving toward specialized platforms 
such as Figure Eight and Mighty AI, which are more expensive but offer better quality control. As 
mentioned earlier, these specialized services have a structure that emphasizes workforce 
management and workflow optimization much more than sheer intermediation. 
 
5. Connected work for connected cars 
Let us now move to the development of connected cars, where AI assists drivers without providing 
full automation. To develop effective speech interfaces for human-machine interaction, large audio 
data sets are required for algorithms to “learn” to recognize sentences and respond adequately. 
Here, the data need to be not only annotated, but produced in the first place: for each language in 
which the digital assistant is to be localized, there is a need for examples of different words and 
sentences to ask about current topics or operational instructions, and these examples must cover a 
wide range of local accents, vocal range and timbre, and contextual conditions (such as background 
noise). Micro-working platforms that can mobilize large numbers of workers are much better-suited 
to provide this diversity, than any single provider. 
All the micro-working platforms in our sample propose – regularly or occasionally – tasks that consist 
in audio-recording one’s voice to train a vocal assistant. Several of the Foule Factory workers that we 
interviewed reported having had to record themselves reading aloud about a dozen short sentences 
in French; others had to devise and record a few different ways of asking the same question. Most of 
these workers understood that the goal of these tasks was to train virtual assistants for use in some 
connected devices such as (though not necessarily) cars. 
As with images, machine learning algorithms can rarely be directly applied to the original audio data 
produced by micro-workers, but require some prior preprocessing, notably annotations allowing the 
same content to be recognized in different environments and contexts. Further human input is thus 
necessary to detect pronunciation and accents, assess sentiment, and classify data into categories. 
The other two areas outlined above – monitoring drivers’ behavior and offering targeted advertising 
– also require production and annotation of data, both visual (for example, face recognition to detect 
signs of tiredness) and sound (recognition of signals from speech). 
According to Schmidt (2019), there is a major difference between data generation tasks such as voice 
recording, and data annotation tasks (whether for computer vision, speech recognition, or other 
usages). The former type requires no qualifications except fluency in the demanded language(s), and 
should ideally be performed by masses of providers, each contributing a small bit, to ensure 
diversity. Such tasks are therefore more likely to be found in generalist platforms, and to involve 
individuals who micro-work occasionally or in their spare time. In contrast, data annotation tasks are 
increasingly complex and demand higher skills, so that they may be executed by smaller numbers of 
individuals who micro-work regularly or even full time; they are offered more often on specialized 
platforms (those we defined as “multi-layer” above) and may in future lead to some degree of 




6. Is micro-work just a passing phase? 
One may optimistically believe that growing algorithmic quality will one day dispense with human 
involvement in providing and preparing “training” datasets. Because algorithms “learn”, they will 
grow better and better even at tasks such as labelling, tagging and segmenting images, or 
categorizing audio datafiles. Indeed, the challenges of even just five years ago have now become 
routine tasks, for example distinguishing different types of animals: AI can now easily solve this 
problem and hardly needs any “cats” or “dogs” labels. But challenges have not disappeared: quite on 
the contrary, they have moved to the next level, as AI ambitions to address more complex problems. 
Companies now need customized resources, want to tackle nuances and details, and demand a very 
high level of precision especially in the automotive sector, where a mistake might be fatal. The open-
ended variety of scenes and situations in which vehicles can find themselves is a reason why there is 
a continuing need for new training data that cover, for example, different lighting and weather 
conditions at different times of the day and year, as well as road circulation modifications due to 
construction, special events or accidents. Far from decreasing, the global demand for data 
generation and especially for data annotation services has thus surged: a recent report by the 
Cognilytica think-tank (2019) estimates that data preparation tasks represent over 80% of the time 
consumed in most AI and machine learning projects, and that the market for third-party data labeling 
solutions is $150M in 2018, growing to over $1B by 2023. 
There is another reason why human input will still be needed even with better and better AI 
solutions: it is the necessity to check the accuracy of those solutions. Among our interviewees, a 
French micro-worker corrected the automated transcriptions done by a virtual assistant over a 
period of several months. She had to listen to the original recordings (audio files lasting only few 
seconds), compare her understanding to the transcript, suggest modifications if needed, and provide 
feedback as to contextual factors (such as speaker’s accent and fluency, or background noise). The 
virtual assistant she was working for was far from a prototype still in the “training” phase: it was a 
widely-sold product in commerce, though currently not for use in cars. The important lesson learned 
is that even when AI solutions are mature (as will happen at some point in the automotive industry), 
they still require human help to fine-tune their responses and improve their performance. 
The concept of “human-in-the-loop” often employed in computer science, refers to production 
processes in which both machines and people play a part, at different stages – not just at input but 
also at output levels. However, except for Figure Eight (whose “8” symbolizes the loop), the 
platforms considered in this study tend to communicate more on preparation of training data, while 
busily playing down the use of micro-work for algorithmic checking and for verification of AI 
solutions. Yet, they all offer this type of tasks, which according to Schmidt (2019) are going to be in 
growing demand in the years to come. Cognilytica (2019) suggests the same conclusion by 
considering that corporate demand is going up at both input and output levels: “The human in the 
loop is not going away any time soon for data labeling and AI quality control” (emphasis added). 
To sum up, micro-work is not bound to disappear with the development of AI solutions. Instead, its 
role and relevance will likely increase. What is changing is the type of tasks offered, relatively more 
diverse and more complex than those classically posted on Amazon Mechanical Turk. As mentioned 
above, Schmidt (2019) also considers that there is a shift from generalist to more specialized 
platforms. In addition to confirming these findings, our work stresses the importance of platform 
diversification, with both global and local channels for AI services based on micro-work – as we are 




7. Diversification within the crowd 
It is well-known that large portions of online work, demanded by companies in North America and in 
Europe, are outsourced to emerging and low-income economies especially in South Asia (Graham et 
al. 2017; Lehdonvirta et al. 2019). While extant literature has focused on English-speaking countries, 
the same is likely to be happening in other linguistic regions (Casilli 2017). While we do not yet have 
enough data to accurately map this phenomenon, we have gathered circumstantial evidence by 
meeting French entrepreneurs who talked about outsourcing to pools of micro-workers in French-
speaking African countries. Moreover, we have interviewed a selected set of micro-workers who 
execute tasks for French clients from Cameroon, the Ivory Coast and Madagascar. Clearly, 
outsourcing to Africa is an economically viable choice insofar as most data-production and data-
annotation tasks can be executed anywhere, requiring only a computer and broadband connection. 
And yet, not all micro-work is done in countries where labor costs are low. In our fieldwork, we have 
interviewed and observed several micro-workers based in France, some of whom engage in online 
labor regularly, including a few for whom it is the sole source of earnings. Our own estimate of the 
French country-level micro-workforce accounts for over 50,000 routine workers and up to 250,000 
occasional ones (Le Ludec et al. 2019). Significantly, the Foule Factory platform bases its business 
model on recruiting French providers, and it recommends paying the French minimum wage to them. 
So, is global competition limited after all, and if so, what are the barriers to it? 
The reason is that there is a need for niche competencies, resulting in lower substitutability among 
micro-workers. Reading aloud sentences in French is a task that only native speakers can properly do; 
so is ability to detect accents, fluency or pronunciation errors. Similarly, recognition of objects such 
as French license plates or traffic signs is a task that requires some familiarity with the local context, 
local experience or at least some ad hoc training. In short, it is because language and culture matter 
(Irani 2015), that local platforms are relevant, and the study of global patterns in micro-work cannot 
be based only on international, English-speaking platforms. It is also for this reason that, even within 
the same linguistic area, not all tasks can be outsourced to workers in the low-income world, and 
residents of industrial countries like France also micro-work. 
 
8. Conclusions: BPA as BPO, and plans for ethical AI 
The above considerations suggest that what goes under the name of Business Process Automation 
(BPA) is in fact often Business Process Outsourcing (BPO). Humans are involved at different stages of 
the automation process, notably in the car industry, and with current trends in technological 
development, there are no signs that their role is going to diminish. Popular fears that “robots will 
steal our jobs” forget the crowds who silently toil to allow robots to function in the first place. The 
issue is not the technical allocation of tasks to humans and machines per se, but rather the 
underlying distribution of power and the design of the organizational set-ups that support the 
production and deployment of technologies. 
The micro-workers that make AI possible are usually external to the AI-developing technology firm, 
formally recruited as independent contractors through a dedicated online platform. Anonymous, 
largely interchangeable, and removed from the core business, they remain out of sight and have little 
opportunity to connect with (and sometimes, even be aware of) fellow workers. Even when 
platforms or clients acknowledge the collective effort to train and calibrate artificial intelligence 
technologies, they frame it in a rhetoric of ephemeral and devalued work that does not need to be 
advertised as such – what matters is the final product, without much emphasis on its origins. This 
lack of both peer-based and exogenous recognition is, to date, the main obstacle to the emergence 
of a new subjectivity predicated on platform labor (Casilli 2019). 
This is one effect that the surge in AI production is already exerting on labor markets, even though it 
is not yet fully deployed in many markets such as the automobile. Questions about the effects of AI 
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should therefore take notice of these precociously-affected workers, the conditions under which 
they operate, the remunerations they receive, and the future perspectives open to them. Proper 
governance of AI and the development of ethical rules for it, widely discussed today, require full and 
explicit consideration of what happens in its back-office.   
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